A game theoretic treatment of contagion in trade networks

by John S. McAlister, Jesse L. Brunner, Danielle J. Galvin, Nina H. Fefferman

Global trade of material goods involves the potential to create pathways for the spread of infectious pathogens. One trade sector in which this synergy is clearly critical is that of wildlife trade networks. This highly complex system involves important and understudied bidirectional coupling between the economic decision making of the stakeholders and the contagion dynamics on the emergent trade network. While each of these components are independently well studied, there is a meaningful gap in understanding the feedback dynamics that can arise between them. In the present study, we describe a general game theoretic model for trade networks of goods susceptible to contagion. The primary result relies on the acyclic nature of the trade network and shows that, through the course of trading with stochastic infections, the probability of infection converges to a directly computable fixed point. This allows us to compute best responses and thus identify equilibria in the game. We present ways to use this model to describe and evaluate trade networks in terms of global and individual risk of infection under a wide variety of structural or individual modifications to the trade network. In capturing the bidirectional coupling of the system, we provide critical insight into the global and individual drivers and consequences for risks of infection inherent in and arising from the global wildlife trade, and any economic trade network with associated contagion risks.