The Contradictions Of Taliban Governance In Afghanistan – OpEd
The Sixteenth Report of the United Nations Security Council’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team offers the most authoritative international assessment so far of Afghanistan under Taliban rule. Far from portraying a coherent or resilient governing system, the report reveals a political order defined by extreme centralization, rigid ideological control, weak institutions and unresolved internal contradictions. Together, these characteristics raise serious doubts about the regime’s long-term effectiveness and its capacity to deliver sustainable governance, stability or economic recovery.
At the apex of the Taliban system stands Hibatullah Akhundzada, who exercises undisputed authority as Amir al-Mu’minin. Unlike conventional heads of state, Akhundzada does not operate through formal institutions or collective decision-making structures. The report makes clear that he is not a symbolic figurehead but the ultimate arbiter of policy, ruling primarily through religious decrees. Physically isolated in Kandahar—now the regime’s real political capital—he does not engage in debate, consultation or public accountability. Governance, therefore, is not merely centralized; it is personalized to an extraordinary degree.
This concentration of power permeates the entire administrative system. Akhundzada appoints loyalists across ministries and provincial structures, while Councils of Ulama have been established in every province to report directly to Kandahar. These councils function less as mechanisms of representation and more as instruments of ideological surveillance. Policy disagreement is discouraged, and dissent—whether bureaucratic, political or religious—is managed through dismissal, detention, coercion or exile. The result is an environment in which conformity is rewarded and initiative is punished.
Beneath the surface of enforced unity, however, the report identifies persistent internal rifts. The most significant divide lies between Kandahar-based hardliners clustered around Akhundzada and Kabul-based pragmatists, most notably the Haqqani Network led by Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani. Haqqani has openly and privately expressed concern over governance failures and the international isolation produced by rigid policies, particularly the ban on girls’ education. His prolonged absence from Afghanistan in early 2025 following the Hajj, and his carefully calibrated remarks upon return, suggested an internal balancing act rather than reconciliation. While some observers dismiss these tensions as manageable, the absence of a clear succession plan makes leadership continuity a latent vulnerability.
The fate of senior Taliban figures who criticized core policies illustrates how ideological discipline is enforced. Officials such as Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanekzai and religious scholar Abdul Sami Ghaznawi were dismissed, detained or forced into exile for questioning the ban on girls’ education. These cases underline a troubling reality: even internal religious debate—once a hallmark of Islamic scholarship—is increasingly criminalized. Ideological rigidity has become not just a policy choice but a tool of political control.
Crucially, the Taliban do not view popular consent as a source of legitimacy. Governance is opaque, poorly communicated and strictly top-down, with little regard for public accountability. The sudden nationwide internet shutdown in October 2025, ordered without explanation and later partially reversed, exemplified the arbitrary nature of decision-making. Reports that the order was countermanded by the prime minister rather than Kandahar further exposed internal tensions and the absence of clear institutional authority.
Although the regime has consolidated control over major urban centres, its writ remains uneven. Powerful factions, particularly the Haqqani Network, enjoy significant operational autonomy so long as they do not challenge regime unity. Selective tolerance of local deviations from unpopular policies reveals the absence of a uniform rule of law and highlights the transactional nature of Taliban cohesion.
One of the most consequential findings of the report concerns the systematic reengineering of Afghanistan’s education system. Education has been placed under Akhundzada’s direct authority and transformed into a vehicle for ideological indoctrination. Curricula have been rewritten to erase civic values, democracy, constitutional law, human rights, women’s rights and international institutions. At least 18 academic disciplines have been banned outright, while more than 200 subjects are taught only after ideological revision. Entire fields—political science, sociology, economics, law, media and gender studies—have been hollowed out. The continued ban on girls’ education remains the most contentious internal issue, contradicting Afghanistan’s own religious traditions in many regions and carrying devastating long-term economic consequences.
Despite acute fiscal constraints, the Taliban have prioritized the construction of mosques and madrassas nationwide. Ministries have been instructed to expand religious infrastructure and strengthen curricula based exclusively on the Hanafi Deobandi school of thought. Other Islamic traditions have been systematically erased, while surveillance and crackdowns on non-Deobandi religious actors have intensified. Ideological uniformity has come at the expense of religious pluralism and social cohesion.
On security, the report offers a mixed picture. Overall violence has declined compared to pre-2021 levels, and sustained operations against ISIL-K have weakened but not eliminated the group. ISIL-K continues to operate in small cells, particularly in northern and eastern Afghanistan, retaining the capacity for high-profile attacks. More concerning is the presence of over 20 other terrorist groups that remain active, most maintaining cooperative relationships with the regime. The absorption of former militants into security forces increases manpower but heightens risks of ideological infiltration, corruption and factionalism.
Economically, the regime governs amid severe stress. GDP contracted sharply in early 2025, unemployment hovers around 75 per cent, and more than 70 per cent of the population depends on humanitarian assistance. Forced returns of millions of Afghans and restrictions on female aid workers have further strained capacity, despite modest improvements in domestic revenue collection.
The report’s conclusion is sobering. While the Taliban have consolidated power and imposed a form of order, this stability is brittle. It rests on coercion, ideological conformity and repression rather than inclusive governance or broad-based legitimacy. For Pakistan and the wider region, these internal dynamics carry serious implications. An Afghanistan that is internally rigid, economically distressed and deeply resistant to reform is not a source of durable stability, but a lingering and unpredictable challenge.