Indonesia’s Gaza Gamble – OpEd
The potential Indonesian involvement in the new Board of Peace for Gaza requires a thorough evaluation of their foreign policy stance because the world now expects more from Jakarta. The initiative functions as an international system which assists Gaza's post-conflict stability and rebuilding process. The initiative supports Indonesia's growing diplomatic influence while upholding its dedication to Palestinian independence, which stands as a fundamental principle of its foreign policy. The people of Indonesia strongly back Palestinian rights, which Indonesian governments have maintained through all their official statements at local and international meetings. The paper demonstrates that Indonesia must decide between using its deep moral and political support for Palestinian independence and public backing for Palestinian causes to gain international power and moral authority through the Board of Peace membership while facing potential dangers from this involvement. The unknown political and financial intentions of other nations pose a threat to Indonesian diplomatic autonomy and its fundamental foreign policy principles and international standing.
The primary challenge for Indonesia lies in the ambiguity surrounding the true objectives of the Board of Peace. The initiative presents itself as a peace-building platform, yet its decision-making systems, funding mechanisms and future objectives remain undefined. The Indonesian foreign policy based on non-alignment, multilateralism, and moral consistency faces a major structural problem because of this unclear situation. The city of Jakarta needs to decide if joining the Board will help it achieve its goals for Gaza or if it will simply validate an initiative controlled by stronger nations. The situation has become more critical because Indonesian citizens maintain strong support for Palestine throughout their entire society. Any wrong move by the government would lead to negative reactions from the public, which would harm foreign policy trust and reduce Indonesia's position in the Muslim world.
The potential advantages of taking part in activities remain substantial despite these worries. The Indonesian government would gain more power to determine Gaza's future governance structure, humanitarian relief distribution, and reconstruction planning after the war. The world recognises Indonesia as its biggest Muslim-majority democracy, which performs UN peacekeeping duties while maintaining its position as a nation with exceptional moral power and operational expertise. The initiative would help Indonesia achieve middle power status as a developing nation because it would prove the country's ability to join international peace negotiations. The city of Jakarta actively pursues international leadership through its G20 presidency, Indo-Pacific diplomatic efforts, and development partnership growth, so Board membership would create opportunities to expand its global reach. The organisation should use engagement activities to build stronger relationships with its essential partners, which include the United States, the European Union and Middle Eastern countries, for better security, development and humanitarian collaboration.
The advantages need to be evaluated against the major negative aspects which exist. The main issue at hand is the restricted ability to affect decisions. The Board could face control by larger nations which maintain different strategic goals than Indonesia does regarding Palestine, even though Indonesia has joined the organisation. The city of Jakarta would experience a situation which brings symbolic participation but results in the loss of essential influence during this process. The domestic reaction to an unclear or disputed program would produce negative responses from civil society organisations, religious bodies, and political leaders who base their Gaza perspective on moral values instead of strategic considerations. The Board's actions, which differ from UN frameworks and OIC positions, would threaten to damage Indonesia's credibility as a multilateral nation. The process of joining this initiative demands members to make financial and operational investments, which might include sending personnel for humanitarian work and rebuilding efforts, yet they will not necessarily obtain matching control over project results. The situation creates an equal threat to Indonesia's reputation because the nation could end up supporting decisions which Palestinians reject and which seem to serve foreign interests better than the needs of residents.
The Board of Peace faces additional problems because its members might have secret motives. The initiative enables analysts to review evidence which shows how specific powers influence Gaza's political direction through their strategic objectives. The upcoming reconstruction contracts, which will become available after the conflict, serve as a potential economic incentive for these countries. The Board serves as a gatekeeping system which controls the distribution of these opportunities to select companies and states. The initiative contains geopolitical elements because it works to establish control over Muslim-populated nations while it fights against Iranian, Turkish and Qatari influence and supports particular Middle Eastern strategies of different international blocs. Peace mediation functions as a governmental instrument which enables them to build peaceful public perceptions while they maintain their secret strategic objectives. The Indonesian government needs to assess all possible solutions because its foreign policy requires the defence of national sovereignty together with the maintenance of its moral principles.
The upcoming challenges which Indonesia faces will be very difficult to overcome. The city of Jakarta needs to handle competition between major powers while upholding its policy of remaining independent from all nations. The organisation needs to uphold domestic support through its decisions, which should match what people expect and follow Indonesia's official position regarding Palestine. The Board needs its architects to provide both transparency and accountability through complete disclosure about their authority, their management structure, and their decision-making procedures. The Indonesian government needs to work with multilateral organisations, including the UN and OIC, to protect its diplomatic goals through this participation.
The Indonesian government needs to establish conditional engagement as their primary method to reach its objectives. The Indonesian government should show willingness to participate in the Board, but should first define essential conditions, which include governance transparency, UN framework compliance and equal decision-making power for all members and confirmation that Palestinian representatives will lead the initiative. The method enables Indonesia to maintain its diplomatic freedom while protecting its moral reputation, and enables Jakarta to create the initiative from start to finish instead of facing it as a reactive measure. The initiative shows Indonesian citizens and international observers that the country actively backs its fundamental values through hands-on involvement instead of backing different initiatives.
The Indonesian decision about the Board of Peace will establish their position in Gaza's future development while simultaneously affecting their complete international relations framework. The initiative enables Indonesia to take charge of decision-making processes, but it generates potential risks which endanger national autonomy, national image and moral standing. The Board needs to establish specific targets because its lack of direction has created an urgent situation which requires complete evaluation. The Indonesian government needs to create partnerships which will help achieve its goal to establish itself as a respected global power that defends peaceful values and justice.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's own.
References
- Middle East Monitor. (2026, January 21). Indonesia should not join Trump’s Board of Peace. Middle East Monitor.
- Pandle, Peter. Indonesia, Gaza Intervention: Prospect and Pitfall Commentaries https://s3-csis-web.s3.ap-southeast-1.amazonaws.com/doc/CSIS_Commentaries_01524_Indonesias_Gaza_Intervention-_Prospects_and_Pitfalls.pdf?download=1
- Fadlillah, S., & Komarudin, U. (2026). Prabowo’s independent, active foreign policy on Palestine and its global implications. Jurnal Wacana Politik, 11(1)