Central Asia’s prospects for critical mineral mining and transport connectivity will sink if the region cannot reach an agreement on water sustainability.

The water crisis in Central Asia is one of the most serious problems facing the region. The implications remain critical to US national interests as well. 

A solution to this crisis exists at two levels: regional and international. Without solutions at both levels, water scarcity is bound to continue destabilizing the region and discouraging external partners from investment and engagement.

The severity of the crisis is increasing as countries in the region pursue water-intensive artificial intelligence and nuclear energy projects. The two primary sources of water in the region are the Amu Darya and Syr Darya Rivers. Both sources are under extreme stress due to different factors, including the management of transboundary river resources, which involves deep trust issues and competition between upstream and downstream countries on these two rivers.

The Soviet Union’s inefficient water infrastructure left a lasting impact on the region’s resources, with long-term declines in riparian flow and a 90 percent reduction of the Aral Sea. About 80 percent of the glaciers of the Tian Shan mountain range have also experienced shrinkage due to climate change.

The regional water crisis intersects with US interests in three ways. 

First, Central Asia is landlocked between Afghanistan, China, Russia, and Iran, placing it at a geopolitical crossroads that affects US foreign policy considerations.

Second, because at least 25 of the 54 minerals the United States designates as “critical” are found in the region, water scarcity affects US efforts to diversify supply chains away from those of its main rival, China.

Third, water stress also affects the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor, a trade route between China and Eurasia that bypasses Russia, as regional security is key to its existence. 

In the worst case scenario, water supply instability could lead to an economic crunch and plunge Central Asia’s peoples into uncertainty and distrust of their governments. This situation critically affects US geopolitical interests, given its investments and plans in the region.

To ameliorate the crisis, the countries of Central Asia must overcome their historic suspicion and draft a framework for water governance, including a treaty, a single implementation body, and a set of enforcement mechanisms. 

Meanwhile, the international community, especially the United States and financial institutions, must provide technical assistance, funding, and diplomatic support to modernize water plants, fund climate studies, identify new water sources, and integrate Afghanistan into a unified water plan.

Washington Has Made Its Promise to Central Asia—Now It Must Keep It

The C5+1 Summit in November 2025 marked an important shift in the United States’ involvement in Central Asia. A $1.1 billion Tungsten mining project in Kazakhstan, including $900 million from the Export-Import Bank, demonstrates the US intent to curb Chinese influence over the supply chain of critical minerals. 

However, environmental change is putting these investments on a shaky foundation. In fact, the Middle Corridor, which is often hailed by US and European policymakers as a solution to Russia and China’s regional dominance, is already facing the effects of climate change. For instance, the sea level around the Caspian ports of Aktau and Kuryk, Kazakhstan, has dropped by 2 meters since 2004 and could drop an additional 9 to 18 meters. Ships at these ports are consequently loaded at only 75 percent capacity. 

The same risks apply to the critical minerals sector because mining is a water-intensive activity. An analysis by the US Geological Survey has shown that water-stressed regions such as Central Asia can see up to 40 percent of their water resources used for mining. Without sufficient access to water supplies, US critical minerals partnerships would be at risk.

The Opportunity for Central Asian Water Cooperation

Despite the current crisis, there is evidence that countries in the region are willing to set aside their historical mistrust given the high stakes. The most obvious evidence of this has been the settlement of border disputes between the two countries of the region. 

In February 2025, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed an agreement on border delimitation, ending the violent border clashes of recent years. A month later, Uzbekistan joined the agreement with the two countries as well. If the region’s nations are willing and able to resolve complex border disputes between themselves, they should be equally willing to negotiate an arrangement for the fair and sustainable use of water resources.

The regional leadership has already shown some willingness to act on these water problems. In July 2025, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev proposed establishing a regional “Water and Energy Consortium.” At a regional summit held in November 2025, the president of Uzbekistan, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, advocated for the establishment of an “Economic Community of the States of the Central Asian Region.” While the regional countries’ intention to act on the issue of water resources has been made clear, the mechanisms to do so are still lacking, and this is where the United States could help.

The Costs of Inaction on Water Sustainability

The United States has invested a great deal of its political and financial capital in building partnerships with the countries of Central Asia. The critical minerals agreements, investments in the Middle Corridor, and the broader idea of offering an alternative to Chinese and Russian influence depend on a stable region capable of delivering on its development promises.

The precondition for all that is water. Without effective regional water management, there will be supply chain problems with mines, a deteriorating Middle Corridor, rising tensions between upstream and downstream countries, and governance pressures from scarcity. Although China is already dominant in the Central Asian mining sector, it shows little interest in negotiating water frameworks for transboundary rivers. Nonetheless, Beijing could still step into any diplomatic vacuum Washington might leave on the water issue should it see an opportunity.

The issue of water diplomacy is not a secondary matter or the preserve of environmental specialists or activists. It is a key issue that may determine the success or failure of the strategic investments the United States has recently undertaken in Central Asia.

About the Author: Dania Arayssi

Dania Arayssi is a senior analyst at the Central Asia Center of the New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy. Arayssi also serves as an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and teaches at George Washington University, where she teaches Comparative Political Economy. Before joining New Lines, Arayssi held analytical and research roles with the World Bank, USAID, Oxfam America, and the US Army War College. Her work has been published in Foreign Policy and the Digest of Middle East Studies as well as regional and international media outlets.

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