The 112th Signal Battalion in Panama
“NO ORDINARY SIGNAL UNIT”
The 112th Signal Battalion in Panama
by Christopher E. Howard Army, Veritas
Bullets ripped through Hangar 450 at Albrook Air Station, Panama, in the late evening of 19 December 1989, just as U.S. Army Special Forces Major (MAJ) Kevin M. Higgins and his Company A, 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group (A/3-7th SFG) prepared to depart for their H-Hour target: the Pacora River Bridge.1 “We lifted off to go to the fight,” Higgins explained, “but the fight had come to the men at the hangar.”2 Two of them were Staff Sergeant (SSG) Henry N. McCrae and Sergeant (SGT) Steven I. Elizalde, from the 112th Signal Battalion (Airborne), one of the newest Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) units.3 Their small signal element, consisting of three-man Special Operations Communications Assemblage (SOCA) teams, was providing secure communications for the Special Operations Command, South (SOCSOUTH), led by Colonel (COL) Robert C. ‘Jake’ Jacobelly.
Later, while he scanned his target from a cow pasture on the west side of the Pacora River, MAJ Higgins talked with Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) David J. Wilderman (J-3, SOCSOUTH) and Captain (CPT) Charles T. Cleveland (S-3, 3-7th SFG) “like they were standing next to me.”4 The SOCA team at Albrook provided Wilderman and Cleveland the situational awareness to prioritize high-demand assets, like the AC-130 Spectre gunship and the quick reaction force (QRF) at Albrook. Once committed, SOCSOUTH had nothing to reinforce other elements in contact.5 Clear and timely communications were essential to mission success on the opening night of Operation JUST CAUSE, and the 112th Signal Battalion SOCAs delivered. They continued to do so throughout the operation.
This article details 112th Signal Battalion origins and explains how it was manned and equipped as a dedicated special operations communications battalion. The battalion’s ‘trial-by-fire’ in Panama, 1989 – 1990 is highlighted. The focus is the three-man SOCA teams that provided SOCSOUTH and ARSOF elements secure tactical communications during Operation JUST CAUSE and the follow-on stability operation, PROMOTE LIBERTY.
Origins
The Army committed to modernizing its special operations forces (SOF) after the hostage rescue mission in Iran (Operation EAGLE CLAW) failed in 1980. 1st Special Operations Command (1st SOCOM) was provisionally established at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in 1982, to command and control ARSOF. About the same time, forward-thinking officers began ‘beating the drum’ for a signal unit capable of supporting both 1st SOCOM and theater-level Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Forces (JUWTF).6
From its activation in 1986 until 1990, 112th Signal Battalion soldiers wore the Shoulder Sleeve Insignia (SSI) of 1st Special Operations Command, its higher headquarters.
Once such officer was MAJ James D. ‘Dave’ Bryan, a Special Forces (SF) and Ranger-qualified Signal Officer. His experience in 7th SFG (including two years commanding its signal company [1977 – 1979]) made him aware of the challenges inherent to joint special operations communications.7 When Bryan returned to Fort Bragg in June 1984 as the Assistant Chief of Staff/Communications and Electronics Officer, 1st SOCOM, he championed the creation of an ARSOF signal unit capable of supporting ARSOF headquarters and task forces in multiple theaters. At the time, neither the Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE), the only SOF joint signal unit, nor the SF signal companies, were resourced for those missions.8
Armed with Army studies and requirements documents, such as the Army Mission Area Analysis (1983), Special Operations Forces Master Plan (1984), and the Multi-command Required Operational Capability 2-84 (1984), Bryan prepared to brief his plan the Army.9 He recognized that the Signal Corps would be reluctant to support the creation of a dedicated “ARSOF Communications Support Element,” which borrowed from Joint terminology; a signal battalion similar to those in the ‘Big Army’ would be an easier sell.10 Bryan identified three specific needs for an ARSOF communications battalion: a flexible structure that allowed SOF communications packages to be tailored to the supported mission; a modernization strategy that ensured ARSOF communicators had state-of-the-art equipment, through priority placement on the Department of the Army Master Priority List; and a “professional home for ARSOF communicators” that grounded them for continuity and did not stunt their career progression.11 His pitch succeeded, and the Army approved Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) 11015J500, “Special Operations Communications Battalion,” on 1 April 1985.
The 112th Signal Battalion (Special Operations) (Airborne) was established provisionally in June 1986, with Bryan in command, and was formally activated at Fort Bragg on 17 September 1986.12 It inherited the lineage of the World War II-era 512th Airborne Signal Company and the 112th Airborne Army Signal Battalion, both inactive since 1945. It had an authorized strength of 16 officers and 229 enlisted soldiers, organized into a Headquarters Detachment, a Base Operations Company and a Forward Communications Support Company.13 Manning came from excess Signal Corps billets rather than from within 1st SOCOM.14 Its soldiers quickly identified themselves as ‘Shadow Warriors,’ derived from the unit motto Penetra Le Tenebre – Penetrate the Shadows.15
Per the TO&E, the 112th Signal Battalion was to “provide required C3 [command, control, and communications] systems between the unified commander, major special operations forces (SOF) headquarters, Army Special Operations Command [1st SOCOM] subordinate commands, and other commands as required/directed.”16 The battalion was to support SOCSOUTH and Special Operations Command, Europe (SOCEUR), which belonged to Army-supported combatant commands (COCOMs): U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) and U.S. European Command (USEUCOM).17 The battalion was also “to establish communications liaison teams at various levels within the host country and/or supported and adjacent commands.” Those teams became synonymous with the equipment they used: the “Special Operations Liaison Communications Assemblage” (SOLCA), later simplified “SOCA.” The battalion’s fourteen SOCA teams were initially assigned to Company B, but a subsequent reorganization reallocated them evenly between two regionally aligned companies.18
The 112th Signal Battalion Distinctive Unit Insignia (DUI) was approved on 15 August 1986. Orange and white (silver) are the colors of the Signal Corps. The dagger, an established symbol of Special Operations organizations is black and white (silver) in reference to the Battalion’s covert and overt missions. It is winged to emphasize present day capabilities for speed of deployment by air. The black color enhances the motto which is translated “Penetrate the Shadows.” The lightning flashes reflect electronic technology. The motto is in Italian in reference to the unit’s first area of combat operations.
Each SOCA team consisted of three soldiers: one Sergeant First Class (SFC/E-7), one Sergeant (SGT/E-5), and one Specialist (SPC/E-4), although it was not uncommon for Staff Sergeants (SSG/E-6) to serve as team leaders or for Privates First Class (PFC/E-3) to serve on SOCAs. Each team member was Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 31C, Radio Operator-Maintainer or, less commonly, another 31-series MOS.19 Airborne-qualified and able to deploy on the first aircraft, SOCAs provided secure communications between the theater-level SOF commander and subordinate elements.20
As the first 112th Signal Battalion Commander (‘Shadow Six’), LTC Bryan oversaw a period of rapid growth for the new battalion. It doubled in size, from 144 soldiers at activation to its full complement of 288 by mid-1988.21 Bryan prioritized getting the right people, fostering the right attitude, and providing them with the right equipment for the job.22 In this, he was aided by Command Sergeant Major (CSM) Billie F. Phipps, a capable battalion staff, and highly competent non-commissioned officers (NCOs). His command philosophy was condensed into five words: “Excellence in everything we do.”23
Major General (Ret.) James David Bryan was instrumental in winning Army approval for what became the 112th Signal Battalion. He then served as its first Commander, the first to hold the title “Shadow Six.” In 2019, he was named an Army Special Operations Forces Icon.
From the beginning, battalion leaders promoted a competitive mindset. The soldiers responded, believing that theirs was a special unit, due to its unique ARSOF support mission.24 Team sports and battalion runs built unit cohesion. Physical training was tough. Expectations were high, initiative was rewarded, and leaders were held accountable. Unit morale surged as a result.25 “They knew it was not ‘business as usual,’” Bryan recalled.26
Bryan also understood that most conventional Army communications systems were too bulky for ARSOF’s short notice, small footprint deployments. To get the right equipment, the battalion customized standard Army signal systems to meet mission requirements and procured cutting-edge commercial systems when necessary.27 It also fielded new super high frequency (SHF) satellite communications and high frequency (HF) multichannel systems. Special fabrication was done ‘in house,’ often with assistance from Tobyhanna Army Depot, Pennsylvania.28 Two such projects had major impacts.
The first was the SOCA kit, consisting of ultra-high frequency (UHF) tactical satellite (TACSAT), HF, and frequency modulation (FM) line-of-sight (LOS) radios; secure facsimile and teletype; encryption devices (KY-84, KY-57, KYV-5 or Sunburst processor); commercial power interface; and generator.29 In its original configuration, the kit weighed over 1,200 pounds and was transported in a coffin-sized container.30 Battalion personnel cut the bulky metal racks that held the various systems to a more manageable size, and reorganized the other SOCA components until the entire kit fit in four footlocker-sized containers that could be carried by two soldiers and transported on a commercial aircraft.31 This was important because aircraft space dictated number of personnel and equipment size. The SOCA was often the only 112th communications package deployed on ARSOF missions.32
A second customization project was installing a dual rear axle on the standard five-quarter ton M-1028 Commercial Utility Cargo Vehicle (CUCV), making it capable of hauling an AN/TSC-93A multichannel satellite terminal previously transported by an M35 two-and-a-half ton truck.33The eight-foot parabolic antenna, previously carried on a second truck, was modified to fit on a trailer attached to the custom CUCV.34 The entire system could roll on/off a C-130 or C-141 aircraft, something not possible in its original configuration, but essential for SOF employment.35
In June 1988, LTC Bryan handed over command of the 112th to LTC Steven R. Sawdey, a likeminded officer who Bryan first met in Korea in the early 1970s, when both were in the 2nd Infantry Division. The transition was nearly seamless, as Sawdey shared his predecessor’s commitment to technological innovation and realistic, mission-focused training.36 To him, getting the “right people” included airborne-qualified soldiers, and he fought to keep this requirement when manning shortfalls led the Army to send non-airborne personnel to the 112th.37 He also believed the best way to gain acceptance in the SOF community was to “get out there and do stuff.”38 Sawdey’s command philosophy reflected an aggressive mentality, and included an addenda: “Be prepared to kill for the mission.”39 CPT James S. ‘Steve’ Kestner, one of his company commanders, made sure that every one of his soldiers read it: “We were not your conventional signal unit.”40
The combination of tough training and high morale had LTC Sawdey’s ‘Shadow Warriors’ eager to deploy and prove themselves.41 Many of the battalion leaders, Kestner noted, were SF-qualified ‘long-tabbers’ or had previously served in Special Operations units, including its first two commanders.42 Senior NCOs were highly trusted, having been proven under stress.43 Experience had been gained in exercises like FUERZAS UNIDAS in USSOUTHCOM, and FLINTLOCK in USEUCOM. These exercises allowed the battalion to practice supporting a JSOTF, while identifying organizational and individual strengths and weaknesses.44
Panama
SOCAs gained operational experience in deployments to USSOUTHCOM, beginning with the HAT TRICK counterdrug missions in 1987.45 After COL Charles H. ‘Chuck’ Fry, the SOCSOUTH commander, requested SOCA support in early 1988, teams began 60 to 90-day rotations to Panama, Honduras, El Salvador, and Colombia, often with only a two week break between trips.46 The operational tempo (OPTEMPO) was grueling, but it became a point-of-pride for the SOCA men.47 Team leader SSG Thomas A. Ayers, a charter member of the battalion, recalls being gone so much during the late 1980s that his landlord prorated his rent, and joked that he needed a Green Card to get back into the country.48
The 112th’s SOCSOUTH mission took on greater importance as ARSOF intensified contingency planning for combat operations (BLUE SPOON) in Panama.49 MAJ Donald Kropp, battalion Operations Officer (S-3), represented the 112th Signal Battalion in those sessions, with First Lieutenant Oliver K. Wyrtki.50 Due to the persistent U.S. presence in Panama, robust fixed station communications networks already existed in the Canal Zone, but they were susceptible to attack from the Panama Defense Forces (PDF), and under surveillance by at least three Soviet ships transiting the Canal.51 Furthermore, existing secure military networks were insufficient to accommodate the demand resulting from the large influx of forces in BLUE SPOON. Accordingly, MAJ Kropp planned for the battalion to supply the Joint SOF headquarters in Panama with its own satellite communications network, but knew that it would take time to move the equipment into place.52
In early October 1989, with tensions between the U.S. and Panama escalating, two SOCA teams deployed as part of the security enhancement mission.53 Those teams, which included SSG McCrae and SGT Elizalde, were on the ground when Operation JUST CAUSE began on 20 December. However, the 112th did not receive the expected call to deploy more forces. As ARSOF units jumped into combat that night, and while 3-7th SFG carried out its D-Day missions, the majority of the 112th Signal Battalion was at Fort Bragg feeling “painfully invisible.”54
The omission was unintentional, a consequence of the short notice deployment, rapid pace of combat operations, and not being included early in the XVIII Airborne Corps-orchestrated deployment list. MAJ Kropp had planned a greater part for the 112th, but those factors reduced the battalion role.55 As a result, ‘Shadow Warrior’ contributions to JUST CAUSE were largely tactical. It was “SOCA-led war for the 112th,” said CPT Kestner. Regardless, LTC Sawdey sent him to Panama to “sort out what’s going on” and to figure out how to get more of the battalion into the fight.56
On 20 December, CPT Kestner and SFC Robert Malton flew to Panama, arriving at Howard Air Force Base. The two were taken by a 3-7th SFG security element to SOCSOUTH headquarters at Albrook Air Station. There, Kestner briefed COL Jacobelly, who praised the two SOCAs in country. He told Kestner to help the SOCSOUTH J-3 and J-6 ‘plus up’ signal support by writing a Statement of Requirements to justify more SOCAs.57 Kestner worked with MAJ Roberto A. Ortiz, the J-6, and CPT Charles Cleveland, the S-3, 3-7th SFG.
As CPT Kestner worked to get more SOCAs into Panama, Hangar 450 at Albrook came under fire a second time, most likely stray rounds from a gunfight near Quarry Heights.58 The SOCA radio operators noticed that the radio signal was suddenly much weaker. Quickly checking their equipment, they discovered that the tactical satellite antenna atop the hangar was rendered inoperable by gunfire.59 A backup system was activated, but it was a reminder that the fight was ongoing, despite major tactical successes in the opening days.
With the requirement for three additional SOCAs validated on 24 December 1989, the teams were notified.60 SSG Thomas Plunkett, SGT Darell A. Brown, and SPC Glenn G. Oliver made up one of those SOCAs. Like many, SGT Brown had been to Central America multiple times since joining the 112th two years prior. This time, inclement weather at Fort Bragg presented an unexpected obstacle to him and the others assembling for deployment. A neighbor with a four-wheel drive (4×4) vehicle delivered SGT Brown to his unit.61 LTC Sawdey sent out 4×4 trucks to gather others stranded by the snow.62 Once all of the teams were present, they departed as scheduled, reporting to SOCSOUTH Headquarters on Christmas Day.63
Initially, the SOCAs in country were all located near Panama City, either at Albrook or Howard, but several ‘pushed out’ with supported ARSOF elements.64 SGT Brown’s SOCA team stayed at Albrook, providing a link between SOCSOUTH HQ and the teams at the remote forward operating bases (FOBs). SSG Thomas A. Ayers’ SOCA team, by contrast, went to FOB 72 at Rio Hato airfield with Operational Detachment Bravo (ODB) 710, 2-7 SFG, who had relieved the Rangers. They kept information flowing between the Operational Detachments Alpha (ODAs) operating in the field and the ODB, and between the ODB and SOCSOUTH HQ.65
On 30 December, two more SOCA teams were validated to support the ad hoc Civil Military Operations Task Force being established to support Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY stability operations.66 By the time these teams arrived on 1 January 1990, the PDF was largely neutralized and Panamanian dictator General Manuel Noriega was holed up in the Nunciatura in Panama City. Nonetheless, the lack of civil institutions and law enforcement presented problems.
When LTC Sawdey and his battalion command sergeant major (CSM) Louis ‘Lou’ Black got to Panama, he pushed to support all SF ODBs and ODAs operating throughout Panama with SOCAs.67 They provided critical TACSAT capabilities and secure, real-time communications to forward SF elements. The SOCA supporting ODB 770, A/3-7th SFG was SOCA Team Four, made up of SFC Elijah C. Harvin’s, SGT William D. Childs and SGT James Shepherd.68
Headquartered at La Chorrera, Panama, SOCA Team Four sent critical information and intelligence to the battalion, and provided the ODB commander with printed operations orders, intelligence assessments, and updated rules of engagement from SOCSOUTH. These were passed to the ODAs further afield.69 “It was a fast moving situation,” recalls Higgins. “The SOCA instinctively distinguished routine from critical message traffic, and alerted the commander accordingly.”70 The SOCA Team Four mission with ODB 770 ended in mid-March 1990. Their two months of superb support did not go unnoticed.
The SOCSOUTH memorandum that awarded the Special Forces Shoulder Sleeve Insignia (SSI) as a combat patch for Operation JUST CAUSE participants included eighteen 112th Signal Battalion soldiers. When SOCA Team Four was inadvertently left off the list, MAJ Higgins formally requested his three SOCA communicators be added.71 COL Jacobelly did so. “The 112th SOCA Team shared our hardships and dangers and manned the perimeter,” Higgins explained. “That is why SFC Harvin’s team earned the right to wear the SF shoulder patch.”72
SOCSOUTH awarded the Special Forces SSI as a combat patch to twenty-one 112th Signal Battalion soldiers for participation in Operation JUST CAUSE.
Conclusion
The 112th Signal Battalion presence in Panama peaked at 30 personnel in early January 1990. It included seven SOCA teams, LTC Sawdey, CSM Black, and several staff planners.73 Some 112th soldiers redeployed back to Fort Bragg in January and, by the end of March 1990, only a small element, led by CPT Eric G. David, was supporting stability operations.74
Although limited in numbers, the ‘Shadow Warriors’ in Panama ‘punched above their weight,’ providing SOCSOUTH and other ARSOF units secure communications when theater systems were overwhelmed.75 MAJ Kropp reported that, “in many cases, the 112th provided the only communications lifeline available to deployed Special Operations elements” in Panama.76LTC Sawdey described the performance of his veterans as “magnificent.”77
Some of those who spent Christmas 1989 in Panama would spend the next one in Saudi Arabia supporting Operation DESERT SHIELD. LTC Sawdey was not among them. He received orders for the Army War College, and handed over command to LTC Samuel R. Higdon in June 1990. Prior to leaving, Sawdey addressed his battalion. Noting the lack of fanfare for ARSOF returning from Panama, he told his soldiers, “It’s in the nature of our character to be quiet professionals. Our identity is to be defined by what we accomplish, not who we are.”78 Every soldier in the formation nodded. “At that moment,” CPT Kestner “knew the 112th Signal Battalion was a brotherhood.”79
Post-Script: 112th soldiers returning from Panama brought home a bullet-riddled satellite antenna, retrieved from atop Hangar 450, Albrook Air Station. LTC Sawdey had it mounted on a sturdy wooden base. It served as the 112th Signal Battalion Commander’s Cup for years to come – a literal ‘war trophy.’
TAKEAWAYS
- The 112th Signal Battalion was conceived as an expeditionary unit, able to provide dedicated communications to SOF headquarters in two theaters simultaneously.
- Five SOCA teams provided SOCSOUTH secure communications during Operation JUST CAUSE; two additional SOCAs supported civil-military operations during PROMOTE LIBERTY.
- Due to the short duration of JUST CAUSE, the 112th Signal Battalion’s large multichannel satellite terminals were not needed in Panama. It was truly SOCA-led war.
Acknowledgements: The author would like to thank the veterans who made this article possible: MG (Ret.) James D. Bryan, COL (Ret.) Kevin M. Higgins, COL (Ret.) Steven R. Sawdey, COL (Ret.) Donald Kropp, COL (Ret.) James S. Kestner, SFC (Ret.) Thomas A. Ayers, SFC (Ret.) Steven I. Elizalde, SFC (Ret.) Darell A. Brown, Mark Buchner, and William D. Childs.