U.S. Marine POWs of the Savage Japanese Captors, WWII
CAPTURE
All but four of the 2,274 Marines who became prisoners of war in World War II were taken by the Japanese. The known exceptions were Marines assigned to the Office of Strategic Services , better known as the OSS, who were captured in 1944 by German forces while engaged in covert activities i n company with the French underground . Of the remainder of the Marines who were captured, 268 died en route to or in prison camp, and 250 men, who were known to have been captured but are otherwise unaccounted for, are pre- sumed to have died . A total of 1,756 captured Marines returned to the juris- diction of the United States ; a very small number of these were escapees, and the rest were liberated at the end o f the war.2 The majority of the Marine POWs had been captured early in the war. The rest, mostly aviation personnel, fell captive to the Japanese after the beginning of Marine air operations in the Allied South Pacific drive .
On 8 December 1941 (Manila Time) , Japanese forces took their first Marine prisoners of war—the officers and men of the American Embassy Guard, Pei- ping, and of the Marine Legation Guard , Tientsin. A detail of 22 men from the Tientsin detachment was captured while stockpiling supplies at the Chingwang- tao docks in anticipation of an immedi- ate evacuation. The North China Ma- rines were scheduled to depart Ching- wangtao on 10 December 1941 in the President Harrison, which had evacu- ated the 4th Marines from Shanghai during the last week of November .
At approximately 0800 on the 8th, however, about 1,000 Japanese troops surrounded the Tientsin barracks, while three enemy planes circled overhead .
The Marine gate sentry phoned his com- manding officer, Major Luther A . Brown, and stated that a Japanese officer wanted to speak to him .3 The officer, a Major Omura who was well known to Brown , brought a written proposal that all of- ficers and men be assembled in one place
in the barracks compound, and all o f their weapons and equipment in another , while the Japanese took over . The al- ternative to surrender was “that the Japanese would enforce their proposa l with the troops at hand .” 4
Brown told the major that he would sign the proposal only if the Japanes e accorded his men the privileges due them under the Boxer Protocol to which Japan and the United States had been signatories . Following a telephone con- versation with the local Japanese com- mander, Lieutenant General Kyoj i Tominaga, with whom Brown had bee n friendly in prewar days, Major Omura stated that Tominaga agreed to the stip- ulation and that Japan would honor it i f
valid. Brown believed that this stipula- tion should have guaranteed the repatriation of his men .5
General Tominaga arranged fo r Brown to telephone Colonel William W. Ashurst, senior Marine officer in North China and commander of the America n Embassy Guard in Peiping . Ashurst told Brown that he was accepting a similar Japanese proposal and advised the Tientsin Marine commander to do the same.° The embassy and legation guards thought that if they offered no resist- ance, they would be considered part o f the diplomatic entourage and therefore would be repatriated . Unfortunately, the basis for this belief was nonexistent. Because their initial treatment was rel- atively mild, and because they received repeated informal Japanese assurances that they would be repatriated, the Marines made no attempt to escape .?
Following the establishment of communications with the Japanese Govern- ment through Swiss diplomatic channel s for the purpose of setting up the exchange of Japanese and American con- sular officials, the United States at- tempted to get Japan to recognize the diplomatic status of the North Chin a Marines. In a telegram on 26 December 1941, the Swiss Government was requested to inform Japan that “The United States Government considers that its official personnel subject to thiS exchange includes . . . the marine guard s remaining in China and there under
the protection of international agreement. . . .”8
In reply, Japan stated that “it is unable to agree to include United States Marine Guards remaining in China a s they constitute a military unit.” 8 The United States was busy at this time set- ting up the exchange program overall and informed the Imperial Government through Swiss channels that it would revert to this point at a later date . Japan inferred from this statement that “the United States Government do not insist in inclusion of the Marine Guards in the present exchange .” 10 This inference was incorrect because on 13 March, when it provided a list of the Americans to be repatriated, the Department of State referred to what it had said previ- ously regarding the return of the Marine guards and stated that it expected the Japanese Government “to take cognizance of their true status as diplomatic guards.” 11
Neither Major Brown nor Colonel Ashurst, who had surrendered the Pei- ping guard at 1100 on 8 December, knew of this diplomatic interchange . On 3 January 1942, the Peiping Marines were brought to Tientsin and quartere d with Brown’s troops . At Major Brown’s intercession, Major Edwin P. McCaul- ley, who had retired and was living in Peiping but was recalled to active duty as the Quartermaster for the Peiping Guard, was relocated by the Japanese to a Tientsin hotel, and later returne d to the United States on the first exchange ship .12
On the 27th, the entire group of Marines was moved, together with all personal effects, by train to Shanghai , where a Japanese officer told them in English as they entered the prison camp , that “they were not prisoners of war although they would be treated as such and that NorthChinaMarines would be repatriated .” 13 Until the exchange ships left without the Marines, the men believed that they would be repatriated . Brown said after the war that they were convinced that they were at least slated to be returned to the United States, but that the excuse the Japanes e gave for failing to send them back wa s that there was not enough room for them on board the exchange ships .
On 2 February 1942, the North Chin a Marines arrived at Woosung prison camp, at the mouth of the Whangpoo River near Shanghai, where they joine d the Marine survivors of Wake Islan d who had arrived on 24 January . Also at Woosung were a handful of Marines, who, unlike the others, received diplo- matic immunity and were to be repatri- ated later in 1942. These men were Quartermaster Clerk Paul G . Chandler, First Sergeant Nathan A . Smith, Supply Sergeant Henry Kijak, and Staff Sergeant Loren O . Schneider, all members of the 4th Marines who had been left at Shanghai to settle government accounts after their regiment had saile d for the Philippines .16 For some unknow n reason, unless they had been gulled into Believing so the Japanese thought these last four were part of the U . S. consular staff at Shanghai and there – fore entitled to diplomatic immunity.
Chandler and the other three Marines became prisoners on 8 December, and were transferred several times to other prisons in the Shanghai area before they, too, arrived at Woosung. This was a former Japanese Army camp, approxi- mately 20 acres overall, and completel y enclosed with two electrified fences . The buildings were all frame structure and unheated. Most of the prisoners were not dressed warmly enough to with- stand the biting Chinese . winter, and all were insufficiently fed . ‘
The second group of Marines to become captives of the Japanese were the 153 members of Lieutenant Colonel Wil- liam K . MacNulty’s Marine Barracks Sumay, Guam, including the 28 Marine s assigned to the Insular Patrol (Police) . Saipan-based Japanese bombers hit the island of Guam on 8 December (Manil a Time) and again on the 9th . The Guam Marines took up positions in the butts o f the rifle range on Grote Peninsula and , after making all possible preparation s for a stiff defense, awaited the anticipated Japanese assault.
It was not long in coming, for early on the 10th, two separate enemy force s landed, one above Agana, and the mai n group below Agat. Aware of the over- whelming superiority of the enemy an d in order to safeguard the lives o f Guamanian citizens, Captain George J . McMillin, USN, Governor of Guam, sur- rendered the island to the Japanese shortly after 0600 . Scattered fighting continued throughout the day as th e enemy spread out over the island and met isolated pockets of opposition . Nonetheless, the defenders could offer only token resistance to the well-armed Japanese, who quickly had control o f the entire island .
On 10 January 1942, the America n members of the Guam garrison were evacuated to prison camps in Japan . After a five-day sea voyage, the pris- oners arrived at the island of Shikoku and were imprisoned at Zentsuji,1S where they remained until they wer e transferred in June 1942 to Osaka on Honshu. First Sergeant Earl B . Ercanbrack, as senior Marine noncommis- sioned officer of the Guam men, becam e camp leader at Osaka from the date o f their capture until October, when Japa- nese Army authorities turned the POW s over to the tender mercies of civilian guards and work supervisors . Until that time, the Marines were treated fairly . Although the Marines were assigned to heavy manual labor both at Osaka and Zentsuji, none of the men felt that the “work was unfair or the treatment other than just and honorable .” 19 This situation changed after the middle of October when the POWs were treated “as criminals, subjected to ridicule and humiliation, and . . . suffered cruel and unjust punishment without opportunity to offer protest or seek justice .” 20
Some of the Guam prisoners believed that it was not entirely proper to wor k so hard for the enemy, and a numbe r of the POWs at Osaka “formed a some- what informal, loose group or faction who felt that it was our duty to slow dow n the National (Jap) War Effort. W e never seemed to properly understand the Jap guards, we stumbled, spilled bags, caused minor damage and bettere d our own morale but did little real damage to their war effort.” 21 In October 1942, 80 men of the Osaka camp wer e called out of formation, advised that they had been observed by prison au- thorities, who had decided that th e Americans were non-cooperative an d therefore to be transferred to a more severe camp. “So this group, half USMC and half USN (known thereafte r as the `Eighty Eight Balls’) were sent to Hirohata to work as stevedores shovel- ing coal and iron ore at Seitetsu Stee l Mills.” 22
Perhaps some insight into the reasons underlying Japanese treatment of prisoners may be found in the followin g statement made by a senior enemy offi- cer to Ercanbrack’s group on the da y that it was transferred to Hirohata camp, west of Osaka. The Japanese colonel told the Americans that We were cowards, else we would have killed ourselves as brave Japanese soldier s would have done, that he could not forget that our comrades in arms were killing Japanese brothers and husbands, that we chose the disgrace of a cowardly surrender and that we must suffer.23
As Japanese war reverses mounted an d Allied planes began bombing the Hom e Islands, the lot of the POWs grew worse .
After a heroic stand against tremend- ous odds, on 23 December the defender s of Wake Island surrendered to become the third group of Marines to be cap- tured by the enemy . The Wake prisoner s were comprised of the survivors of the 1st Defense Battalion detachment an d VMF–211.24 Also taken at the sam e time with these Marines and a few Army Air Corps and Navy personnel were some 1,100 civilian contract em- ployees who were actively engaged in constructing new and extensive defense s on the island when war struck .
Immediately following the capitula- tion of the Wake Island garrison,25 the men were subjected to numerous indig- nities regardless of rank . By sunset of 23 December, all of the Americans o n the island had been rounded up. Com- mander Winfield S . Cunningham, the island commander, Major James P . S. Devereux, the senior Marine officer on duty chose the disgrace of a cowardly surrender and that we must suffer.23
As Japanese war reverses mounted an d Allied planes began bombing the Hom e Islands, the lot of the POWs grew worse .
After a heroic stand against tremend- ous odds, on 23 December the defender s of Wake Island surrendered to become the third group of Marines to be cap- tured by the enemy . The Wake prisoner s were comprised of the survivors of the 1st Defense Battalion detachment an d VMF–211.24 Also taken at the sam e time with these Marines and a few Army Air Corps and Navy personnel were some 1,100 civilian contract em- ployees who were actively engaged in constructing new and extensive defense s on the island when war struck .
Immediately following the capitulation of the Wake Island garrison,25 the men were subjected to numerous indig- nities regardless of rank . By sunset of 23 December, all of the Americans on the island had been rounded up. Com- mander Winfield S . Cunningham, the island commander, Major James P . S. Devereux, the senior Marine officer on
Wake, and eight others were confined i n a one-room cottage. Most men of the Marine detachment had been taken a t their defense positions, but not befor e they had dismantled and destroyed thei r personal weapons and had damaged be- yond any further use their crew-served pieces. Those wounded prior to 23 De- cember and those who had been hos- pitalized for other reasons had bee n placed in an underground ammunitio n magazine for protection from Japanese bombs.
Both the wounded and others captured after the enemy landings wer e held under guard at the VMF–211 air – craft parking area until dusk on 2 5 December, when they were marched around the island to the vacated civilian barracks . At this time, the wounded wh o were completely unable to walk were taken to the improvised hospital men- tioned above. “During this period of approximately 54 hours, there was no medical attention of any kind, no form of protection from the sun by day and cold rain by night, no food, and almost no water.” 26
On 11 January 1942, the Americans were alerted that they would be evacuated to prison camps shortly . A group of regulations, violation of any one of which could result in the death penalty , was read to the prisoners . Amongst the heinous crimes for which they could b e executed were such things as : “talking without permission and raising loud voices, ” “carrying unnecessary baggage in embarking,” and “using more than two blankets.”
Early on the morning of 12 January, the prisoners were herded aboard th e Nitta Maru, a relatively new Japanese passenger liner; enlisted Marines, sailors, and civilians were placed in th e holds, while the officers and the senio r civilian supervisor were locked in th e mail room. Left on the island were approximately 300 civilian constructio n workers, who were to rebuild installa- tions there, and another 100 or s o civilians and servicemen who were to o ill to be moved. Most of those who re- mained were later evacuated to prison camps in either China or Japan . Tragi- cally, nearly 100 of the civilians were lined up on a beach on Wake the nigh t of 7 October 1943 and executed by a machine gun firing squad. For this crime, Rear Admiral Shigematsu Sakai- bara—the Japanese commander of Wake—and a number of his officers were tried, found guilty, and hanged after the war’s end .28
Dressed in whatever tattered tropi- cal clothing they could find 29 and carry- ing only the barest minimum of per- sonal possessions allowed by their cap – tors, the Americans spent 12 days on board the ship under very difficult con- ditions. They were systematically de- prived of their valuables, fed only sporadically, not permitted to talk t o one another, and given no room fo r exercise. On 18 January, the ship arrived at Yokohama, where the squadron commander of VMF-211, Major Paul A . Putnam, and a number of other men were removed and taken to camp s in Japan. Six days later, the Wake prisoners arrived at Shanghai. Here they were told that they would be paraded through the city and marche d out to the Woosung camp . Somehow the
parade did not materialize.30
Major Devereux particularly remembered th e bitter cold the prisoners felt at Yoko- hama and Shanghai, for they were onl y partially clad in khaki uniforms and not acclimated to the change from th e tropical weather of Wake.3′ Once the Americans arrived at Woosung, the Japanese Navy relinquished its respon- sibility for the POWs to the Army. Most of the Wake prisoners remained at Woosung until they were transferred in December to Kiangwang, five miles away. In May 1945, they began a jour- ney that was, for most of them to end eventually in Japan .32
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